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Extending the Hydraulic Paradigm:  
Reunification, State Consolidation, and Water Control  
in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta after 1975
Simon Benedikter*
As vividly depicted by James Scott (1998), environmental transformation and the 
utilization of natural resources for development have, in modern human history, 
often been driven by the high-modernist world views of (authoritarian) govern-
ments.  In this context, environmental historians ascribe a powerful role to (hydraulic) 
engineers as agents of ecological and social transformation.  With their epistemic 
power arising from their association with rational-modern science and technology 
development, engineers emerged as protagonists of large-scale landscape engineer-
ing and water control ventures coordinated by the nation state in the light of mod-
ernization.  Against this historical background, this paper traces the post- reunification 
hydraulic mission in the Mekong Delta (1975–90) and highlights the strategic role 
that state-led water control efforts guided by hydraulic engineers have played in 
economic recovery, nation building, and state consolidation under socialism.  It is 
argued that water resources development in the Mekong Delta is deeply embedded 
in the country’s historical trajectory, which is framed by national division, the strug-
gle for independence, and the subsequent reunification under the Vietnam Com-
munist Party’s leadership.  The socialist hydraulic bureaucracy, which arose in the 
1950s in North Vietnam, capitalized on the opportune moment of reunification of 
North and South and systematically expanded its control over the southern water-
scape.  In this context, the paper presents a historical perspective on how water 
development strategies and institutional arrangements evolved when North Viet-
namese engineers took over water resources management in the Mekong Delta. 
These past developments still have far-reaching implications for present-day water 
management dynamics in Vietnam’s largest river estuary.
Keywords: Mekong Delta, Vietnam, water resources development, modernization, 
hydraulic mission, state engineers, water bureaucracy
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Surrounded by the sea to the east and south, and topographically shaped by the interplay 
of mighty rivers, mountains, deltas, and coastal plains, water is omnipresent in Vietnam. 
From ancient times, the economic basis of Vietnam’s civilization was grounded in inten-
sive irrigated rice production, an activity that requires sophisticated knowledge, skills, 
and technology in water control.  The Vietnamese people can look back at a long history 
and grand tradition of managing water flows.  The origin and cradle of Vietnamese civi-
lization is in the Red River basin where floods, typhoons, and droughts occur frequently 
and in disastrous magnitude.  Ensuring survival in this harsh and unpredictable environ-
ment has always required collective efforts in developing flood protection infrastructure 
and managing irrigation.  Unsurprisingly, hydraulic management emerged as important 
function of the royal state administration in pre-colonial Vietnam.  Protecting the nation 
and people from natural disasters was politically critical, since peasant rebellions and 
social unrests often arose in the aftermath of famines brought on by severe flooding and 
droughts (Smith 2002, 77; Tessier 2010, 264).  Etymologically, the Vietnamese word thủy 
lợi,1) a term of Chinese origin and best understood as hydraulics in the sense of water 
control and the utilization of nature by human, comprises connotations of water manage-
ment that traditionally derive from the above mentioned utilitarian and technical orienta-
tion of human-nature relation.
Compared to the Red River Delta, where human settlement and hydraulic interven-
tions into the deltaic landscape go back as far as the beginning of the Christian era2) 
(Tessier 2010, 264; Tuan Pham Anh and Shannon n.d., 2), the making of the modern 
Mekong Delta, Vietnam’s largest river estuary located in the Southwest of the country, 
commenced far later, but has been similarly bound up in the idea of humans striving for 
dominion over the natural world.  Structural interventions imposed on the deltaic ecology, 
and the resulting environmental change, have been among the major contributors to the 
profound transformation of the Mekong Delta in modern history.  In essence, the Delta’s 
history can be divided into two epochs characterized by divergent human-society rela-
tions: first, people’s adaptation to the Delta’s complex hydro-ecology; second, people’s 
efforts to tame and control the Delta’s natural forces with the use of rational science and 
modern technology.  The latter feature has prevailed over the past 200 years, as com-
prehensively traced by Biggs (2010).  Particularly in the past 30 years, the need for 
1) While thủy means water, lợi means beneficial or useful.
2) Due to early population pressure in the Red River Delta, the royal court was forced to continuously 
develop new technological innovations in hydraulic engineering for land reclamation, flood protec-
tion, and increased agricultural productivity.
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regulating water flows in the light of flooding, salinity, and droughts, has modified pro-
foundly the Delta’s physical shape.  Hydraulic engineers and planners played a critical 
role in this socio-ecological transformation of the modern Delta, where water manage-
ment nowadays, is performed at a large scale through a dense system of water control 
infrastructure consisting of dikes, embankments, sluices, and partly pumping stations 
(Evers and Benedikter 2009a).  With reference to Wittfogel’s (1957) concept of hydraulic 
society, the delta’s march toward total hydro-management has transformed the delta 
society from a traditional river-water civilization,3) which used to live in tune with nature, 
into a modern hydraulic society4) which strives to exert control over the natural environ-
ment in which it is embedded (Evers and Benedikter 2009b).
Along the path to total hydro-management, various intersections of water control, 
politics, and nation building were at the heart of the Delta’s modern transformation. 
Similar to Swyngedouw’s (1999; 2007) portray of Spain’s departure from feudalism to 
modernity, a process driven by technological progress in water control, the Mekong 
Delta’s changing socio-nature and transformation into a predominately human-made land-
scape can best be understood as part of hydro-social modernization.5)  In this, technologi-
cal progress in water control is given a critical role in the process of transforming a once 
sparsely populated and human-hostile waterscape into a highly regulated, standardized, 
manageable, and productive economic and social space (Käkönen 2008; Biggs et al. 2009). 
Irrespective of the political regimes that ruled over the Delta in different epochs, water 
control was the key paradigm referenced in exploiting the Delta’s abundant land and 
water resources, and mitigating negative impacts caused by nature.  Related to what Scott 
(1998) conceptualized as high-modernism, it was the boundless faith in modern science, 
technology and the firm belief in state management capacity that triggered consecutive 
hydraulic engineering ventures to tame the Delta’s complex hydro-ecology.  Covering 
the period from the end of Vietnam War (1975) to the promulgation of what became 
known as Renovation policy (1986), or Đổi mới in Vietnamese, this paper follows on the 
hydraulic history of Mekong Delta by Biggs (2010), which ends in 1975, and traces the 
hydraulic mission6) subsequently launched by the socialist regime.
Based on exhaustive literature review, archival work, and empirical research con-
3) Văn minh sông nước
4) Xã hội thủy lợi hiện đại
5) According to Swyngedouw, hydro-social modernization defines social, political, and economic trans-
formation on the basis of state-directed water control.  It highlights the importance of water engi-
neering and waterscape modification as the key factor for modernization and changing socio-nature.
6) The term hydraulic mission refers to top-down, state-directed, and state-monopolized development 
of water resources and water infrastructure for the promotion of growth, modernization, and pros-
perity (Molle et al. 2009; Treffner et al. 2010, 253).
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ducted in Vietnam from 2008 to 2011 in context of an international research project,7) 
this paper explores water resources development over the past 40 years.  Landscape 
engineering, water control, and environmental change are viewed as part of a historical 
process embedded in Vietnam’s national reunification and state building efforts guided 
by the socialist government.  Against this background, the paper traces the conquest of 
the Mekong Delta by Vietnam’s national hydraulic bureaucracy and how this process has 
shaped institutional arrangements, power structures, and ideologies associated with 
water resources management in past and present.  Particular attention is devoted to the 
corps of state engineers, their role in hydro-social modernization, and how they benefited 
from this process.
II The Hydraulic Paradigm and the Global Rise of Engineers
Before turning our attention to Vietnam, a brief journey through modern water history 
and its protagonists, namely the guild of hydraulic engineers and bureaucrats, provides 
the conceptual gateway into this paper.  Water control and landscape engineering have 
been crucial ingredients of modernization and development over the past centuries of 
human history.  Modern water sciences, hydrology, and engineering technologies have 
facilitated large-scale structural interventions that have made possible the regulation of 
water flows and the modification of waterscapes over large parcels of geographical land. 
As emphasized by Molle (2006, 4), harnessing water through complex hydraulic instal-
lations became a crucial precondition for the Industrial Revolution, modern irrigated 
agriculture, or energy production through hydropower.
The implementation of large-scale water control efforts required heavy investment, 
and the scale and technological complexity of many hydraulic installations, such as hydro-
power, irrigation, or flood control schemes, needed centralized coordination and manage-
ment.  This cohesion has created firm state monopolies in water resources development 
and management, and in the related activities of planning, design, construction, and reha-
bilitation of water infrastructure.  The monopolization of water control under the state 
favored the rise of powerful hydraulic bureaucracies (hydrocracies) around the world 
(Molle et al. 2009; Treffner et al. 2010, 254).  This somehow mirrors pre-modern types 
of state coordination of water management referred to in Wittfogel’s (1957) conceptual-
ization of hydraulic society, namely: ancient polities that rose from state-coordinated col-
7) “Water-related Information System for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong Delta, Viet-
nam” (2007–13) funded by the Federal German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and 
the Vietnamese Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST).
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lective efforts in water control and hydraulic agriculture.  However, in fact, it was only 
in the nineteenth century with the rise of modern sciences that large-scale water control 
technology advanced fundamentally.  Molle (2006) points to the importance of advanced 
knowledge in physics, topography, geology, and hydrology that provided the basis for an 
improved description of the water cycle, the marshalling of the hydraulic power of rivers 
for industrial development and modern irrigated agriculture.
In a broader sense captured in political ecology, the paradigm of human mastery 
over nature became a driver of modernity and nation building, manifesting in regional 
water control plans and ambitious landscape engineering ventures.  Hydraulic works, 
such as huge dams, reservoirs, and irrigation grids emerged as icons of modernity created 
by ultimate state power (Molle et al. 2009, 334).  These projects did not only transform 
natural features such as river valleys, marshlands, or coastlines, but also rearranged 
human habitats such as settlement structures, the organization of land use, and access to 
natural resources in specific parcels of geographical space (Blackbourn 2006, 5).  Rational- 
scientific planning and technological progress entails the involvement of specialized 
knowledge.  The triumphal march of engineer-biased water science laid the foundation 
for a new and powerful professional group to emerge as protagonist of the great work of 
nation building and social transformation: the guild of engineers.  Their modern science-
based epistemic monopoly on hydrology, geology, geography, cartography, and other 
related disciplines legitimized their avant-garde role in society (Scott 1998, 96;  Blackbourn 
2006, 7).
The vital role that hydraulic engineers played for such ambitious ventures is docu-
mented by environmental historians such as Worster (1985), who highlighted the role 
played by engineers in the colonization of California and the grand mission of damming 
and diverting rivers to irrigate the arid land of the American West.  Another example is 
Blackbourn’s (2006) work about the making of modern Germany as being a conquest over 
nature, whereby state engineers drained marshes, modified coastlines, and straightened 
rivers such as in the Upper Rhine Valley.  The hydraulic paradigm of water control did 
not only stand for modernization and prosperity.  In a wider sense, national hydraulic 
efforts became means to achieve political ends such as nation and state building.  Develop-
ment through large-scale water control projects unified countries and legitimated politi-
cal regimes, as vividly described by Wester et al. (2009) on Mexico’s revolutionary irriga-
tion movement, or by Swyngedouw (2007) for the case of Franco’s hydro-social dream of 
harvesting every drop of surface water flowing across Spain’s waterscape.
In the early twentieth century, in many parts of the world, development of cen-
tralized water infrastructure at basin, regional, and national scale called for the creation 
of professional and central state agencies to plan, construct, and manage water infrastruc-
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ture on behalf of the nation state.  The need for centralized coordination of water control 
efforts resulted in the emergence of powerful water bureaucracies embedded in the 
modern state machinery (Molle et al. 2009).  The establishment of the Confederaciones 
Sindicales Hidrográficas in Spain in 1879 (Swyngedouw 1999, 459), the Department of 
Canals in Thailand (Siam) in 1902 (Riggs 1966, 125), and the Comisión Nacional de Irrig-
ación in Mexico in 1926 (Wester et al. 2009, 397) are a few manifestations of the global 
rise of powerful hydrocracies consisting of technical and economics-oriented engineers. 
In this, one observes how the guild of hydraulic engineers endowed itself with bureau-
cratic and even political power, thereby becoming part of political elite.  From the post-
enlightenment period in Europe, the hydraulic paradigm spread around the world as a 
scientific-technocratic engineering mission, including in the colonies, where “subduing 
nature and marshalling water became part of the mission of Western countries” of bring-
ing civilization to the world (Molle 2006, 4).  The Vietnamese Mekong Delta is a classical 
illustration of such, whereby large-scale interventions initiated by the colonial regime 
were perpetuated by post-colonial regimes.
III The Vietnamese Mekong Delta: A Hydraulic Engineering Laboratory
The Deltaic Landscape: Hydro-Ecological Complexities
After a 4,800 km-long journey from the Tibetan Plateau in China through Myanmar, Laos, 
Thailand, and Cambodia, the Mekong River reaches its estuary located at the southern 
tip of Vietnam, where the river empties into the South China Sea.  The deltaic topography 
is characterized by the extreme flatness of a vast plain (with an average elevation of 0.5 
to 1.2 meters), where paddy fields, fruit orchards, and villages are arranged along count-
less courses of rivers, canals, and creeks branching out into open space.  Blessed with 
fruitful alluvial soils and abundant water resources, the Mekong Delta is one of the most 
agriculturally productive areas in the world.  Not less than 40 percent of the national food 
output of Vietnam originates from there, most notably export items such as rice, aqua-
culture, and fruits (Käkönen 2008).  The dense network of over 30,000 km of waterways 
crosscutting the waterscape is the fundamental characteristic of the delta region, acting 
as the lifeline and infrastructural backbone of the Delta’s agro-economy.
Unsurprisingly, the region is characterized by an extremely complex hydro-ecology. 
Physically, the Mekong Delta has been formed by the interplay of powerful natural forces. 
Over thousands of years, gigantic amounts of suspended sediments,8) traveling in the 
8) The sediment load of the Mekong Delta is estimated at 160 million tons per year (Hashimoto 2001, 20).
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Mekong River, have been deposited in the estuary and then redistributed by waves, tides, 
and currents according to the rhythm of seasonal flooding and the daily ebb and flow. 
Located in the humid tropics of Southeast Asia, the Delta’s hydrological cycle is shaped 
by the monsoon.  Saline intrusion is most intensive during the dry season in April, when 
the river discharge is low and the tidal fluctuation is strong.  Consequently, seasonal 
droughts and water scarcity constrain agricultural production in the coastal belt.  The 
flood season coincides with the wet season, reaching its peak in November.  During this 
period, the overflow from the major distributaries and the influx of floodwater from 
Cambodia merge.  Unlike the other river basins in Vietnam, like the Red River Delta, 
where floods can appear suddenly and with destructive power, the Mekong Delta’s flood 
regime is calm and prolonged.  Inundation levels rise and withdraw very slowly over 
several weeks.  The highest flood levels and duration occur in flood plains in the upstream 
delta to about three meters, and in extreme flood seasons up to five meters (Hashimoto 
2001, 6–20; Vo Khac Tri 2012, 51–62).
Pre-socialist Hydraulic Efforts and the Making of the Modern Mekong Delta
Since ancient times, the complex hydro-ecology was considered a potential resource for 
agriculture, but also a major obstacle to development and economic growth.  This view-
Fig. 1 Map of the Mekong Delta River and Canal Network
Source: Amir Hosseinpour (ZEF).
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point emerged as the driving force in human efforts to modify the deltaic landscape in 
order to optimize the use of water and land resources, and curb negative impacts caused 
by nature.  When modern hydraulic technology reached the Delta at the end of the nine-
teenth century, it became a laboratory for ambitious hydraulic engineering projects and 
technical interventions coordinated within the frame of modern state structures.
Landscape engineering and water management, to a limited extent, had already 
commenced in the early Funan period of the mid-third century, when the precursors of 
what would later become the powerful Khmer empire excavated an artificial water grid 
around the ancient capital of Oc Eo (Bourdonneau 2013).  Much later, throughout Viet-
namese colonization beginning in the seventeenth century, a number of new canal proj-
ects were carried out under the Nguyễn administration.  Canal projects, such as the Vĩnh 
Tế Canal, which nowadays demarcates a boundary between Vietnam and Cambodia, were 
strategically critical infrastructure for improving logistics and communication across the 
new frontier land of the Vietnamese empire in the deep Southwest, and for protecting it 
from Siamese and Khmer invasion (Biggs 2010, 65).  Thereafter, the French conquest 
and annexation of Cochinchina,9) which commenced in 1860, led to a rapid intensification 
of technical interventions and modifications of the deltaic landscape.  French colonial 
planners and engineers brought along modern knowledge, technology, and heavy equip-
ment from Europe which permitted them to carry out large-scale infrastructural interven-
tions.  Beginning in the late 1880s, the colonial administration systematically opened up 
the Delta by crafting a canal grid on its surface which served as the main communication 
and transportation network, and along which the colonial state reclaimed land for coloni-
zation and the establishments of large-scale rice estates.  Much of the rice land was owned 
by big landlords who demised small plots of their land to tenant farmers for cultivation. 
As in other parts of the colonial world, water control drove the Delta’s transformation 
into an export-oriented plantation economy based on capitalist principles for rural produc-
tion (Brocheux 1995, 17–40; Biggs 2010, 34–51).  This artificial water grid was the pre-
condition for the Delta’s colonization and became the hallmark of its settlement structure, 
determining people’s access to land and water.  The early man-made canal and river 
network constituted the first layer of high-modernist space upon which ensuing regimes 
built.
As vividly shown by Biggs (2010), although infrastructural interventions have helped 
to convert wild swamps into manageable and productive land, in a wider context of envi-
ronmental change, these man-made manipulations have resulted in unanticipated hydro-
9) Refers to the southern part of Vietnam, which encompasses the Mekong Delta and Southeast 
Vietnam.
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ecological problems.  As in an infinite loop, the unpredictable and often destructive side 
effects of technical progress have required ever expanding engineering and structural 
solutions.  The sheer size of the Delta, its complexity, ecological dynamics, and growing 
human interference have made it almost impossible to predict how nature will respond 
to any modification of the landscape.  Trial and error, therefore, emerged as the modus 
operandi of colonial engineers on the waterscape.  Canal dredging works planned by 
French engineers did not only transform the waterscape, but represented feats of social 
engineering.  With each newly dredged canal, new settlers, plantation owners, and the 
colonial administration moved deeper into formerly isolated areas.  Landscape engineer-
ing was pushed forward by the shared interests of a powerful coalition comprising colonial 
administrators, landlords, public-works engineers, and dredging enterprises (ibid., 47). 
Embedded in the colonial Department of Public Works, French hydraulic engineers 
emerged as protagonists in the making of the modern delta.
After the communist victory over the French at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954, Vietnam 
was divided into two different political regimes.  The subsequent French withdrawal from 
Indochina was followed by the American military engagement, which lasted until the 
mid-1970s.  Apart from sending soldiers and military advisers, the Americans launched 
aid programs, which were meant to drive back the communist insurgency in the Mekong 
Delta.  In the 1960s, modeled after the Tennessee Valley Scheme, the Americans initi-
ated delta-wide water resources development plans as part of a political mission to pacify 
the Delta by boosting rural development and starting a Green Revolution to improve 
socio-economic conditions (Miller 2003, 184–188).  A coalition of US-American advisers, 
engineers, and hydraulic construction companies seamlessly replaced the French Depart-
ment of Public Works.  Beyond the strategic goals of geopolitics, money making interest 
sustained and fueled the cycle of hydraulic planning, investment, and construction from 
which they collectively gained (Biggs et al. 2009, 214–215, 221).  The escalating conflict, 
however, thwarted these ambitious water resources and infrastructure plans.  Ultimately, 
landscaping engineering efforts petered out in the wake of the US-American withdrawal 
from South Vietnam after the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 and the Vietnamization of the 
conflict.
IV The Modern Hydraulic State: Bureaucratic Rule over Land, Water, 
and People
North-South Antagonism and the Quest for National Unity
When in 1975 the Vietnam War came to an end, and the victorious socialist government 
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seized power in the South, the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party in Hà Nội 
faced the immense problem of economic recovery in the context of North-South reunifica-
tion.  One of the most urgent challenges was to overcome disquiet and resentment that 
had grown between the two sides after 30 years of national division.  The other was about 
how to consolidate socialism across the southern territories and integrate the South into 
the socialist state and the command economy model that had been in place in North 
Vietnam since 1954.  With peasants making up the majority of South Vietnam’s popula-
tion, and an abundance of potential for agricultural development, agrarian modernization 
was considered critical for stimulating economic growth in the South.  In essence, the 
development and modernization of rural areas, from where the revolutionary struggle 
for independence and unification received most of its backing, became a key part of efforts 
in state consolidation and nation building in the South (Miller 2003, 189).
While Hà Nội and the Southern resistance movement were unified in the struggle 
for national independence, disharmony emerged over the question of precisely how to 
reunite the country, the pace of reunification and which economic system and policy the 
country exactly should follow.  Moreover, tensions emerged due to Northern domination 
and Hà Nội’s posturing about being in the position to bring up and educate the liberated 
South (Porter 1993, 28–30; Vasavakul 1995, 272).  The North considered itself victor 
over imperialism and as the cradle of socialist modernity and traditional Vietnamese 
nationalism.  After decades of national division into contrary ideological regimes, the 
North regarded the South as poisoned by Western capitalist values.  Putting the South 
back on the right course justified Northern claims to leadership within the unified Viet-
namese nation:
During the war, the party had vehemently denied the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) regime’s seizure 
of the mantle of Vietnamese modernity.  After unification, the locus for the articulation of Viet-
namese identity for Vietnamese south of the 17th parallel shifted dramatically northwards to the 
new national capital, Hanoi.  The former Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) became the 
template for the reforms prosecuted in the South in the post-war years. (Taylor 2001, 26)
North and South officially reunified in 1976 when the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was 
proclaimed with Hà Nội as its capital.  In the following years, it became crucial for the 
national leadership to yield quick socioeconomic success to consolidate its political con-
trol and legitimacy in the South.
The Mekong Delta’s Strategic Role in National Reunification and State Consolidation
In the early years following reunification, economic policies focused on rural areas and 
agriculture development, as emphasized by the General Party Secretary Lê Duẩn in his 
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1976 speech at the National Assembly (Turley 1977, 46).  The fertile land and abundant 
water resources of the Mekong Delta became strategically important in this context (To 
Trung Nghia 2001, 101).  Referring to earlier water resource plans compiled by the US-
Americans, the new regime identified the Mekong Delta as most promising for agrarian 
modernization and achieving national food security as precondition for political stability 
and growth.  Developing the Mekong Delta’s water resources thus emerged as a strate-
gic goal that served higher political ends and, after years of stagnation, triggered a new 
hydraulic mission in South Vietnam.
Indeed, in the Mekong Delta, the development of water resources slowed down and 
even came to a complete stop with the escalation of the military conflict in the late 1960s 
and 1970s (Biggs 2010, 203).  This gave the Northern government an opportunity to point 
to the failures of the French administration and the coalition of the United States and 
Saigon Regime in water control and agrarian modernization prior to national reunification 
under socialism.  In a commemorative publication celebrating the 30th anniversary of the 
Hồ Chí Minh City Association of Water Resources, North Vietnamese state engineers 
assessed the effectiveness of water control and utilization in the Mekong Delta prior to 
1975 as obsolete:
Thinking back to the first days after liberation of the South, this was a time when the North already 
undergone 20 years of building up of socialism (including 10 years of national struggle against the 
aggressive and destructive United States) and was able to keep up pace in the development of 
water resources at a level equal to other countries in the region.  The South, in contrast, had been 
lagging behind since 1945. . . . Each time the Mekong Delta is discussed, much attention is paid to 
the great efforts made by the French in excavating new canals.  However, in reality, water alloca-
tion in those days was sluggish and the bulk of agricultural land remained with only one harvest 
on average, not exceeding 1.5 tons per hectare per year. (Association of Water Resources of Hồ 
Chí Minh City 2006, 7)10)
The Ministry of Water in Hà Nội diagnosed the South as having a deficit of modern scien-
tific knowledge and expertise (To Trung Nghia 2001, 101).  They viewed the adaptive 
nature of water-society relations and agriculture production in the South as outdated.  In 
response, modernizing water resources utilization was formulated a priority goal for the 
South:
Local people in the Delta had no awareness of the role of water resources for development.  Thus, 
the development of water resources in South Vietnam was among the most urgent priorities defined 
by the party and the state [after reunification]. (Association of Water Resources of Hồ Chí Minh 
City 2006, 7)11)
10) Translation by the author
11) Translation by the author
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Reunification and the Political Economy of Water Control and Agrarian Modernization
A brief review of the historical events illustrates the different trajectories of development 
that took place in North and South prior to national reunification, spelling out why engi-
neers from North Vietnam labeled water management in South as backward.  After the 
Geneva Peace Agreement (1954) and the subsequent national division of Vietnam, the 
Democratic Republic in the North, with the goal of agrarian modernization, made sig-
nificant efforts to regulate and harness water flows in the Red River basin.  Being cut off 
from Southern rice surpluses produced in the Mekong Delta, the Northern government 
declared the development of water resources for a Green Revolution a national affair of 
the highest priority.  In the late 1950s, the Northern government established the Minis-
try of Water.12)  Embedded in the socialist state machinery, the water management 
bureaucracy comprised water-related state agencies and state-owned engineering com-
panies at every administrative level to ensure systematic top-down operations.  The 
socialist state mobilized masses of manual labor to dig canals and upgrade dikes as part 
of public irrigation campaigns.  Advisers from the People’s Republic of China and the 
Soviet Union provided funds and technical advice on how to expand and modernize the 
hydraulic infrastructure.  Moreover, water resources management became centralized 
under the planned economy and was implemented as an integrated part of agrarian col-
lectivization, as explicitly shown by Smith (2002, 195–280).  After 1975, to catch up with 
the North, the political leadership in Hà Nội emphasized the need for a comparable policy 
in the Mekong Delta:
. . . without timely cooperativization it is impossible to develop irrigation, impossible to dig the 
network of canals and ditches such as we now have in the North.  Without irrigation double crop-
ping in rice is impossible, development of production is impossible. . . . Irrigation works cannot be 
performed by individual families on individual plots of land.  They must be carried out in each region 
of the entire delta of the southern region where cooperativization has been completed. (Hoang 
Tung, a secretary to the Central Committee, in 1978; quoted in Ngo Vinh Long 1988, 163)
Such views reveal the synergies the party state believed to have found in the nexus 
of water control and the creation of new rural (socialist) institutions, in particular agrarian 
collectivization.  In a speech delivered to young cadres during political training, the party 
secretary of Hậu Giang Province, one of the Mekong Delta provinces in those days, 
emphatically pointed out the vital role water resources development was assigned in this 
process:
The development of hydraulic infrastructure and progress in rural development must go hand in 
12) Bộ Thủy lợi
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hand.  On the one hand, water resources must serve cropping, while agriculture at the same time 
must foster the development of collective groups, collective production units, agricultural coop-
eratives, and state farms.  On the other hand, we have to rely on these organizations to develop 
our water resources for increased productivity, and this will automatically foster and consolidate 
all state-run and collective organizations. (Hậu Giang Newspaper, February 10, 1982)13)
In this sense, it was not only water management that came under state control, but 
also agricultural land and, consequently, the land use planning.  Private property was 
largely prohibited under the new regime.  Farmers in the Mekong Delta were requested 
to join collectively organized and state-run production units.  Due to fierce peasant resis-
tance, however, agrarian collectivization in form of agricultural cooperatives14) (as imple-
mented in the North after 1954) fell short of expectations in the South.  By 1986, only 6 
percent of the Delta’s farmers were organized in forms of collective production (Vo Tong 
Xuan 1995, 187).
Nevertheless, despite its failure in the South, agrarian collectivization had profound 
impacts on the Mekong Delta and its population.  Having recognized that rigid coopera-
tivization,15) as enforced in the North 20 years earlier, was politically unfeasible in the 
South, the regime opted for a less invasive version that encouraged the Delta’s peasantry 
to get organized in so-called solidarity production groups16) or production collectives.17)  By 
integrating farming households in these relatively loosely structured organizations, the 
new regime hoped to quickly integrate the Delta farmers into the central planning econ-
omy (Ngo Vinh Long 1988, 164).  Consequently, the situation in the South evolved dif-
ferently than in the North, such that farmers in the South remained the primary manag-
ers of their land, but had to produce according to central directives.  Also new in the South 
were communal efforts in land preparation, irrigation, and threshing, which arose because 
the individual ownership of the scarce tractors, rototillers, threshers, and irrigation 
pumps was largely abolished under the new regime.18)  Such devices, required in modern 
agriculture, were only available through state-run distribution systems.  The same 
applied to agro-chemicals, specifically pesticides and artificial fertilizers (Vo Tong Xuan 
1995, 187–188).  In addition, a strict rice collection policy obliged farmers to sell rice 
surpluses to government agents at fixed prices (Kono 2001, 77).  Growing state inter-
13) Translation by the author
14) Hợp tác xã
15) Hợp tác hóa
16) Tổ đoàn kết sản xuất
17) Tập đoàn sản xuất
18) Modern irrigation and agriculture equipment already appeared in the 1950s under the French, and 
then expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, partly distributed through American aid programs (Biggs 
2010, 153–226).
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ventionism into rural production shifted key aspects of decision making from on-farm 
(individual) levels to the commune and district level.  This also holds true for water 
management, which increasingly shifted away from the individual household scale toward 
more collective modes of regulating water flows (Miller 2003, 189).  This was facilitated 
by increasing physical changes imposed on the waterscape and water control infrastruc-
ture (Nguyen Duy Can et al. 2007, 77).
Water Control Efforts and the Mobilizing State
Although the policy of collectivization largely deviated from its strictest form, collective 
efforts and mass mobilization in the style of state corporatism or mobilizational authori-
tarianism19) (as denoted by Kerkvliet) was a central feature of state-society relations in 
those days (2003, 30), and also played a vital role in the development of water infra-
structure, particularly in the years immediately after reunification.  Indeed, as financial 
resources and technical equipment were too scarce to fully mechanize interventions in 
response, accomplishing the state-directed hydraulic mission inevitably had to rely on 
intensive labor input similar to what was practiced in the early years of French colonial 
rule from 1860 until the end of the nineteenth century (Biggs 2010, 23–34).
During three decades of military conflict and insurgency in the Mekong Delta (1945–
75), hydraulic infrastructure development gradually dwindled and canal maintenance was 
neglected.  As a result, nature took back what humans once created over decades.  Many 
canals were silted to such an extent that water levels were too shallow to perform proper 
irrigation and drainage functions and could no longer be navigated by boat (ibid., 203; 
Kono 2001, 78).  Canal dredging was therefore urgently needed to restore irrigation and 
drainage capacity.  Furthermore, there was an urgent need to enlarge the canal grid for 
new land reclamation projects and to expand irrigated land with a concurrent shift towards 
high yielding rice varieties, which required intensive water regulation and input of agro-
chemicals (Nguyen Duy Can et al. 2007, 77; Käkönen 2008, 206–208).  Across the entire 
Delta, thus, thousands of farmers, soldiers and cadres were mobilized to manually dig 
and construct hydraulic works under the supervision of local state agencies (Fig. 2).
In theory, every healthy male between the age of 18 and 45 and every woman 
between 18 and 30 was requested to contribute 30 days of public labor20) per year for canal 
digging/dredging (Le Meur et al. 2005, 32).  One of the first public irrigation campaigns 
19) Kerkvliet distinguishes between three different concepts that are commonly used to describe state-
society relations in Vietnam.  One of these is state corporatism or mobilizational authoritarianism, 
which refers to the party-state organization’s ability to mobilize the masses to support certain 
programs and policies (Kerkvliet 2003, 30–31).
20) Lao động công ích
Extending the Hydraulic Paradigm 561
undertaken by the new regime commenced in 1976 in Long Phú district,21) where more 
than 450,000 laborers, including 115,000 women, were mobilized to dig canals and ditches 
for washing out acidic soil, draining saline waters and provide fresh water for irrigation 
(Hậu Giang Newspaper, April 19, 1978).
Public irrigation campaigns intensified in the wake of the Rice Everywhere Cam-
paign for the Mekong Delta, which required infrastructural support to enlarge the area 
under multiple cropping (Biggs et al. 2009, 210).  Expanding the secondary and tertiary 
canal grid and the dike systems became an infrastructural necessity for promoting agrar-
ian modernization (Käkönen 2008, 206).  In Cần Thơ Province, for instance, a great deal 
of the secondary and tertiary canal network, and a number of primary canals, were exca-
vated after reunification in the 1980s and the early 1990s (Kono 2001, 78; SIWRP 2007, 
32).  Apart from improved irrigation and drainage infrastructure, the construction of earth 
dikes along canal banks was meant to either protect fields from flood waters or to prevent 
saline intrusion.
21) The district currently belongs to Sóc Trăng Province.
Fig. 2 Irrigation Campaign: Digging a New Canal under the Red Banner and Yellow Star
Source: Hâu Giang Newspaper, April 27, 1977.
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V The Irrigation Front: Revolutionary Rhetoric, Water Control, and 
State Consolidation
While state engineers designed water control infrastructure, local dwellers were mobi-
lized to build it, and, finally, the socialist state used it as icon of modernity and progress 
to legitimate its claim to rule.  The newly established mass organizations took over the 
role of mobilizing the rural population for collective efforts in public irrigation campaigns. 
It was in particular the Youth Union22) that became active in this field, but also the 
 Farmer’s Associations23) and Women’s Union.24)  Under a system referred to as mono- 
organizational socialism by Thayer (1995), in which civil society was integrated into the 
one-party state system, the socialist regime hoped to mobilize all parts of the local pop-
ulation, whether female or male, young or old, peasant or soldier, Buddhist or Catholic, 
Khmer or Kinh25) for collective efforts in water control and agrarian modernization.
In the early years after reunification, progress in hydraulic engineering and the 
development of water resources made weekly appearances in local newspapers.  These 
front-page headlines enthusiastically glorified the achievements made in water control 
that socialism had enabled.  The nexus of technological modernization, economic devel-
opment, and the guiding role of the new regime were systematically reproduced by the 
state-controlled mass media.  The communist party-state praised itself as the tamer of 
nature and the modernizer of society, bringing prosperity to the Delta’s population:
Long Phú is a coastal district with lots of potential for agriculture and aquaculture.  Prior to libera-
tion [of the South], however, there were no irrigation works, and the bulk of land was exposed to 
salinity and acidic water. . . . After reunification, agriculture moved forward and the first task to be 
accomplished was to develop water resources and build hydraulic infrastructure.  The Long Phú 
Party Committee facilitated the compilation of a plan for controlling salinity, increasing the avail-
ability of freshwater, and providing irrigation and drainage for the entire region. (Hậu Giang News-
paper, March 19, 1980)26)
The hydraulic mission turned into a mission of state and nation building, supplying polit-
ical legitimacy and facilitating state consolidation in an authoritarian context of govern-
ance.  In socialist Vietnam, this phenomenon occurred under the state credo state of the 
22) Đoàn Thanh niên
23) Hội Nông dân
24) Hội Phụ nữ
25) The three largest ethnic groups in the Delta are the Vietnamese (Kinh), the Chinese (Hoa), and the 
Khmer.  For a rich illustration of their relationships, which are traditionally fraught with tension, 
see Brocheux (1995).
26) Translation by the author
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people, by the people, and for the people.27)  The media praised the state-run public irrigation 
campaign as an effort of great unity of the entire people28) and the Party (Hậu Giang News-
paper, March 16, 1977).
The type of language exploited by the state to spread this propaganda and mobilize 
society was embedded with metaphors that had been used during the war years.  It made 
use of rhetorical devices that invoked martial symbols seamlessly transferred from an 
era of armed struggle to one of economic recovery, where it lived on in mass mobilization 
campaigns.  The state appealed to the people’s revolutionary spirit to serve the nation at 
the irrigation front.29)  During the war, the enemy was embodied in imperialistic forces, 
whereas after liberation and reunification, the Delta’s challenging waterscape and hydro-
ecology emerged as the new frontline along which the party and the people jointly fought 
against floods, salinity, and socioeconomic backwardness:
The impression we get from today’s irrigation project sites [collective digging] reminds us of those 
army brigades that marched forward to liberate our fatherland some years ago, but nowadays they 
27) According to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, there is a “state of the people, 
by the people, for the people.  All State power belongs to the people . . .” (Article 2, Constitution of 
Vietnam, 1992).
28) Đại đoàn kết nhân dân
29) Mặt trận thủy lợi
Fig. 3 Banner Inscription: “The Women of Thơi An Commune Dug an Irrigation Canal to Accompany 
the Second Party Congress of the Province”
Source: Hậu Giang Newspaper, April 6, 1977.
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liberate the land from salinity and free people from poverty. (Hậu Giang Newspaper, March 22, 
1977)30)
Those who engaged in digging and dredging were celebrated as the new irrigation 
heroes31) and irrigation veterans.32)  The state-controlled mass media helped to glorify 
water control in order to create the myth of the revolutionary irrigation movement,33) 
which served to bring the revolutionary spirit to the fields to boost rural production (Hậu 
Giang Newspaper, April 19, 1978).
Each digging campaign and each completed irrigation scheme in the various districts 
was celebrated in the manner of military victories.  New canals were named after impor-
tant revolutionary events such as the Liberation Day of Saigon34) or the founding date of 
the Vietnamese Communist Party.35)  Likewise, inaugurations of newly built hydraulic 
works were scheduled for specific occasions that were meaningful in terms of the revo-
lution and struggle for independence.  The opening ceremony of Hậu Giang’s first electric 
pumping station, for example, which coincided with Uncle Ho’s birthday (Fig. 4), nicely 
shows to which extent the socialist state tried to harness progress in water control for 
political ends such as national building:
In these days, when the entire nation competes for the most impressive present one can devote 
to Hồ Chí Minh on occasion of his 88th birthday, this morning (May 19, 1978) the Hậu Giang 
Department of Water inaugurated the first electric pumping station in the province. . . . Among the 
distinguished guests were comrade Lê Phước Thọ, member of the Central Party Committee and 
General Secretary of Hậu Giang Province, comrade Lê Tính, Deputy Minister of Water. . . . (Hậu 
Giang Newspaper, May 24, 1978)36)
VI Northern Domination: Crafting a Hydraulic Bureaucracy for South 
Vietnam
Bureaucratizing and Centralizing Water Resources Management
As described above, during the 1950s and 1960s, the socialist regime poured all of its 
energy into developing water resources and agriculture in the Red River Delta (Smith 
30) Translation by the author
31) Anh hùng thủy lợi
32) Kiến tượng thủy lợi
33) Phong trào thủy lợi
34) The Second Vietnam War ended on April 30, 1975 with the liberation of Saigon.  Since then this day 
has been celebrated as a public holiday.
35) The Communist Party of Vietnam was formally established on February 3, 1930, in Hong Kong.
36) Translation by the author
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2002, 195–280).  After reunification, the hydraulic mission was gradually shifted south-
wards into the Mekong Delta, the new agricultural frontier of Vietnam, as Nguyễn Cảnh 
Dinh, the former Minister of Water recapped 30 years later:
. . . The Ministry of Water changed the direction of the entire sector towards a focus on the develop-
ment of water resources in the South, specifically the Mekong Delta. (Nguyễn Cảnh Dinh37) 2006, 
22)38)
The hydraulic bureaucracy of the socialist North identified the Mekong Delta as a new 
physical space for expanding its power over regional water resources planning, infra-
structure development, and the corresponding investment decisions.  In order to modern-
ize water management in the South, it understood as necessary to transfer to the South 
all the knowledge and experiences, as well as the technology developed over two decades 
of developing water resources in the North:
Making use of the excellent experience that all our organisations in the hydraulic management 
apparatus had gained in the North over many years was a useful asset for developing water 
resources in the Mekong Delta quickly, solidly, and in a tightly coordinated manner—without 
wasting opportunities and resources. (ibid.)
Historically, therefore, the socialist hydraulic mission in the Mekong Delta has its origin 
37) Apart from his function as Minister of Water, Nguyễn Cảnh Dinh was a member of the Central 
Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party in the 1980s and 1990s.
38) Translation by the author
Fig. 4 Inauguration of the First Electric Pumping Station at Hậu Giang Province
Source: Hậu Giang Newspaper, May 24, 1978.
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in the North.  What had been rapidly achieved in the Red River Delta 15 years earlier in 
terms of water control and agriculture modernization was intended to be replicated in 
the South.39)  Hence, immediately after the war had ended the Ministry of Water began 
moving south:
With regard to the establishment of organisational structures, the ministry [Ministry of Water] 
took immediate action and set up a representative office in Hồ Chí Minh City.  Comrades Lê Tính, 
Vũ Khắc Mẫn, Đinh Gia Khánh, Nguyễn Giới, and leading officials of the ministry regularly were 
present in the South, particularly the Mekong Delta. (ibid.)
The office functioned as a satellite of the Ministry of Water in Hà Nội and was assigned 
to facilitate the creation of state management structures in the Southern territories.  The 
rescaling of water management and infrastructure development along parameters of 
central planning led to coordination with a hierarchical architecture.  Financial and admin-
istrative authority over the management of water resources, including the planning and 
construction of infrastructure, became highly centralized following a Leninist fashion. 
As hydraulic technicians and their expertise were short in the South, the majority of the 
human resources simply were transferred from the North:
The prompt foundation of agencies for planning, surveying, engineering, dredging, and construction 
under the ministry followed demand in the Mekong Delta.  The Ministry [of Water] focused on its 
guiding role by coordinating with the Northern provinces for the provision of forces to train, edu-
cate, and promote local cadres, so as to set up and consolidate the hydraulic-bureaucratic apparatus 
in all provinces and districts of the Mekong Delta. (ibid.)
Thus, it was the hydraulic engineers from the Northern part of Vietnam who planned and 
implemented the post-reunification hydraulic mission in the South.  Many of them were 
trained at the Water Resources University in Hà Nội at a time Vietnam was divided into 
two regimes and due to this gained their technical knowledge and practical experiences 
from the river basins of North and North Central Vietnam, in particular the Red River 
Delta.  Immediately after the war ended, hundreds of hydraulic experts, planners, and 
bureaucrats made their way to the South, and together with them came the knowledge 
and technology from the North (Nguyễn Ân Niên and Lê Sâm 2006, 32).  Apart from 
transferring knowledge and technology, sending state engineers from the North allowed 
39) The big leap forward in water control in the North was achieved from 1961–65, the period in which 
the socialist state channeled massive investment into hydraulic infrastructure to modernize agri-
culture (To Trung Nghia 2001, 100).  In the 1960s, more than 80 percent of state direct investments 
were dedicated to water control, in particular the construction of dike polders and large-scale pump-
ing stations to regulate water outflow and intake (Tuan Pham Anh and Shannon n.d., 8).
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the central government to fill strategically important leadership positions in the Southern 
water administration with loyal Northerners, rather than having to rely on untested 
candidates from the South.  Relocated into a new and strange environment, Northern 
engineers were meant to act as nodes for sustaining relationships with Hà Nội, consoli-
dating both political control, and ensuring strict enforcement of the national policies 
formulated in the capital.
In this connection, the Ministry of Water began establishing a range of special 
regional agencies.  These agencies were also meant to represent the will of the ministry 
in the Southern localities and to become reliable enclaves of Northern engineers.  Even 
nowadays, more than 30 years after their establishment, engineers from the North with 
educational backgrounds from the Water Resources University are predominant in all 
central water management agencies in the South of Vietnam (Benedikter 2014).  With 
the founding of the Hydraulic Construction Project Management Board No. 1040) in Cần 
Thơ in 1976, the first of these regional bodies took shape as a central-level project man-
agement board directly subordinated to the ministry, and charged with the coordination 
of infrastructure construction.  One year later, in 1977, the ministry established the 
Sub-Institute of Water Resources Planning41) in Hồ Chí Minh City, which was mandated 
to plan and develop water resources at the regional (basin level) scale, including hydrau-
lic infrastructure for the entire South.  An interview with a senior staff member is sug-
gestive of the hegemony of Northern Vietnamese engineers in this and other central 
water organizations:
After the war, one-third of our staff was sent to the South to remain there indefinitely for the 
development of water resources activities, and only returned to the North after 1985.  Others 
stayed with the Southern Sub-Institute of Water Resources Planning in Hồ Chí Minh City.  I myself 
spent several years in Cần Thơ. (interview, Hà Nội, April 14, 2009)
To strengthen research capacity, generate new knowledge on the Delta’s peculiar water-
ecology and to develop tailor-made hydro-management solutions, in 1978, the Southern 
Sub-Institute of Water Resources Research was set up in Hồ Chí Minh City as a branch 
of the National Institute of Water Resources Research42) headquartered in Hà Nội.  This 
was followed by the Southeast Vietnam Survey Association and the Southern Hydraulic 
40) Ban Quản lý Dự án Đầu tư và Xây dựng Thủy lợi số 10
41) Phân Viện Khảo sát Thủy lợi Miền Nam: Today the institute is called the Southern Institute of Water 
Resources Planning (SIWRP) and still represents the principal planning institute under the central 
government for the Southern region, including the Mekong Delta.
42) Today it is known as the Vietnamese Academy of Water Resources (Viện Khoa học Thủy lợi Việt 
Nam).
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Design Association.  Both of these had been operational in the South since 1975, staffed 
with a few hundred engineers who were sent by the ministry.  In 1983 they were merged 
into a single institute: the Southern Sub-Institute for Water Resources Survey and 
Design,43) with its head office in Hồ Chí Minh City.  All of these central organizations have 
played, and are still currently playing, a prominent role in the development of water 
resources in the Mekong Delta and the South in general.
To ensure effectiveness in implementing the hydraulic mission in the South, there 
was a need to build up a system of local satellites in the Southern provinces apart from 
the central agencies mentioned above.  Integrated in the centralized state administra-
tion, specialized local state agencies were established in each locality to connect the 
central part of the apparatus with the grassroots level.  Structurally, the local hydraulic- 
bureaucratic apparatus followed the overall administrative system as it had been organ-
ized in the North since 1954.  Accordingly, Departments of Water44) were established 
in each province of the Mekong Delta.  These departments were subordinated to their 
respective local People’s Committees but were also governed directly by the Ministry 
of Water in Hà Nội.  Subordinated to these provincial departments were district Offices 
of Water,45) which instructed irrigation cadres in each commune.  While district and com-
mune personnel were locally recruited, leadership positions in the newly established 
provincial Departments of Water were largely staffed with engineers sent from the North. 
During an interview (June 12, 2009),46) hydraulic bureaucrats from Cà Mau Province 
spoke representatively for most other provinces of the Mekong Delta when they said 
that previously the composition of the Department of Water was almost entirely engi-
neers from the North.
Re-mechanization and the Rise of State-Owned Engineering Companies
Due to the empty state coffers, the mobilization of manual labor to dig and dredge was 
crucial in the early years of the hydraulic mission from 1975.  At the same time, the new 
regime also made initial attempts to re-mechanize water control.  Soon after liberation, 
specialized state-owned and military-owned hydraulic engineering and construction com-
panies equipped with dredges, barges, and other heavy equipment cropped up in different 
localities of the Delta and Hồ Chí Minh City.  Following the rationale of a socialist planned 
43) In 1993, the institute was converted into a state-owned engineering and consultancy company called 
Hydraulic Engineering Consultants Corporation II (HEC II).
44) In the beginning, these departments were called Ty Thủy lơi.  Later on, they were renamed Sở Thủy 
lợi and retained this name until 1996, when they were merged into the Department of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (DARD).
45) Phòng Thủy lợi
46) For futher empirical evidence also see Benedikter (2014).
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economy, these engineering companies were integrated into the hydraulic state appara-
tus.  They existed either as centrally-controlled business units under the Ministry of 
Water or as local state companies under the Department of Water in each province.
One of the first centrally-managed hydraulic engineering and construction compa-
nies established by the ministry in the South was Construction Company No. 10 (ICCO 
40).47)  It was established in 1975 with the head office in Hậu Giang Province, right in the 
heart of the Delta and in proximity to the Investment and Hydraulic Construction Project 
Management Board No. 10.  One year later, the ministry established the Hydraulic Engi-
neering, Investment and Construction Company48) (DRECO II) in Hồ Chí Minh City.  In 
1979, the Ministry of Agriculture founded the Agriculture Engineering and Construction 
Company, which in 1984 was renamed Company 62249) and has since remained under the 
control of the Ministry of Defence.  Situated in Cần Thơ City, Company 622 was involved 
in almost all large-scale dredging ventures carried out in Military Zone No. 9,50) which 
administratively encompasses all of the Mekong Delta provinces (People’s Army of Viet-
nam 2004, 545–549).  Furthermore, the Ministry of Transport set up two other large 
state firms in Cần Thơ that became involved in canal construction and dredging.  Apart 
from construction works, the hydraulic mission urgently required heavy machinery and 
equipment, such as engines and technical devices to build up pumping stations and 
sluices.  In 1976, the Ministry of Water therefore set up the Hydraulic Mechanical Engi-
neering Company 27651) in Hồ Chí Minh City, which was assigned to develop and manu-
facture heavy water control equipment and technical systems, including pumps, weirs, 
and sluices (interviews with companies, 2009; Trần Tuấn Bửu 2006, 40).
In parallel, the provincial governments established local water engineering and 
dredging companies that came under the auspices of the newly established provincial 
Departments of Water in Minh Hải52) (1977), Đồng Tháp (1978), Hậu Giang53) (1979), and 
Tiền Giang54) provinces (1981) (interviews with companies, 2009).  Similar to the central 
and provincial state agencies, hydraulic construction companies were dominated by North 
Vietnamese engineers who moved to the South after reunification:
47) Công ty Xây dựng số 10 was later renamed Construction Company No. 40 (Công ty Xây dựng số 40).
48) Công ty Thi công Cơ giới Công Thủy—Đầu tư và Xây dựng later on was renamed Công ty ty Cổ phần 
Tàu Cuốc số 2 (Dredging Company No. 2).
49) Công ty 622
50) Khu Quân sự số 9
51) Công ty Cơ khí Công trình Thủy 276
52) Present-day Bạc Liêu and Cà Mau
53) Present-day Cần Thơ City, Hậu Giang and Sóc Trăng
54) This refers to the Tiền Giang Hydraulic Construction Company (TICCO), which today is one of the 
most powerful hydraulic engineering companies in the Mekong Delta.
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Many other engineer colleagues and I were sent to the South immediately after reunification in 
1976 to take up positions in the newly established local administration of water management in the 
Mekong Delta.  Many of those who came with me had studied at the Hà Nội Water Resources 
University. (interviews with company director, Cần Thơ City, 2008)
This type of career path, as well as others captured in interviews, point to a tight inter-
locking between state management agencies, planning units, and state-owned businesses. 
Together they represented Vietnam’s hydraulic bureaucracy in the South.  State enter-
prises and state agencies were not only bound together in the sense that they were 
unified under the Ministry of Water but also in terms of personalized connections.  Espe-
cially those in leadership positions shared features of an elite group with a strong collec-
tive identity based on a common background in terms of education, career, and regional 
provenance.  Many had studied together at the Water Resources University in Hà Nội, 
the most elite educational facility in water management, before starting a career with the 
Ministry of Water in either a state agency or state-owned engineering company.  Since 
each university class was small in those days and access to the university limited to the 
political elite, students could easily form groups, networks, and a strong esprit de corps. 
Because bureaucracy and business were unified within the socialist state system and 
central planning, cadres in state agencies and state companies frequently exchanged their 
positions by moving seamlessly between state management and state business.  Hun-
dreds of state engineers moved from the North to the South, thereby contributing to the 
expansion of tight networks of North Vietnamese engineers in the South.  As state 
engineers and cadres they greatly benefited from predictable and stable careers, modest 
but regular incomes, coupled with privileged access to health services, housing, and 
education for their families (Porter 1993, 62).  Young graduates from the Water Resources 
University in Hà Nội particularly gained from the organizational expansion into the South, 
where water engineers were in great demand to fill vacancies.  In line with this, student 
enrolment at the Water Resources University increased by 70 percent in the years fol-
lowing reunification (1975–1978).55)
55) According to data of the student secretary, Water Resources University; personally received in 
2009, Hà Nội.
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VII Modernization with Side-Effects: Northern Blueprints and  
Technology Transfer
Ignoring the Local Conditions: Technology Transfer under Central Planning
The hegemony of Northern engineers had far-reaching consequences with regard to the 
development of hydraulic infrastructure in the Mekong Delta.  After a century of foreign 
domination by French colonial engineers and American advisers, the Mekong Delta again 
came under the tutelage of a non-local power when the Northern engineers took over 
responsibility for planning and developing water resources in the South.  As with their 
predecessors in colonial times and during the war, water engineers from the North 
brought along hydrological knowledge and technical blueprints from their native regions. 
At the same time, due to the long period of national division, engineers from the North 
lacked local knowledge and experiences about the South’s distinctive hydro-ecological 
conditions.
In each region of Vietnam, topographies and climatic conditions have very distinctive 
characteristics.  Accordingly, water regimes in the sub-tropical North and the tropical 
South differ fundamentally from each other.  This has profoundly shaped people’s relation 
to, and notions of how, to manage water in North and South.  In contrast to the Mekong 
Delta’s hydrology, which is characterized by the flatness of the land and a rather calm 
and predictable water flow regime, the Red River basin’s hydrology is largely determined 
by the interplay of mountains and plains.  Hence, in the valleys and plains of North and 
North-central Vietnam, sudden floods pose the greatest threat to the people’s life and 
assets.  During typhoons and prolonged downpours, water levels in the Northern river 
basins can rise suddenly from one to four meters within only a few hours.  Masses of 
water then often cascade from higher terrain through river valleys into the plains in the 
form of flash floods, destroying settlements and damaging harvests (Tuan Pham Anh and 
Shannon n.d., 2; Pruszak et al. 2005, 373).
Regionally different water regimes have shaped different perceptions towards water, 
particularly with regard to flooding.  Whereas people in the North traditionally associate 
flooding with disaster, local dwellers in the Mekong Delta consider the flood waters of 
the Mekong River an essential development resource.  Every year the flood seasons 
brings along fertile alluvial soils to spread over the fields as well as aquatic products that 
are critical for local livelihoods.  These divergent perceptions manifest in different terms 
used to denote flooding.  Lũ stands for flood in the North and refers to the destructive 
force of water.  Mùa nước nỗi, which means water-moving season, is the term prevalent 
in the Mekong Delta, referring to the naturally calm nature of the local flood regime.  As 
perceptions of water management differ significantly in North and South, infrastructural 
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interventions and technology would also involve different objectives.  Water control 
infrastructure in the North predominantly aims at protecting settlements and fields from 
sudden and extreme flooding.  Dike polders equipped with irrigation and drainage canals 
and massive pumping systems, some of which are being combined with multi-purpose 
reservoirs to bridge dry periods, constitute a great deal of what characterizes water 
control infrastructure in North Vietnam.  In the Mekong Delta, in contrast, water man-
agement used to be performed more flexibly in adaption to the rhythm of the seasons. 
Flood waters, for instance, are only temporarily kept away from fields until harvest.  Then 
earth dikes are consciously opened to inundate rice fields to benefit from fertile alluvial 
sediments and collect aquatic products carried in by the flood during the flood season 
(Ehlert 2012, 35–73).
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the military conflict in the South thwarted the 
implementation of large-scale infrastructure development in the Mekong Delta for a long 
time and people thus lived adapted to the natural ecology.  Therefore, when North Viet-
namese engineers arrived in the South in 1975 they found themselves in a deltaic envi-
ronment that was largely unregulated (Miller 2003, 189–216), because infrastructure 
such as dikes, sluices, or pumping stations existed only in isolated pilot sites.  To them, 
these conditions were backward and underdeveloped and suggested immediate action to 
improve hydro-management, similar as in the highly regulated Red River Delta.
Large-scale pumping stations were installed in the Red River Delta56) during the 
1950s and 1960s when hydraulic engineering efforts reached an apogee in the socialist 
North (Smith 2002, 195–280).  There, pumping stations well served their purpose of 
irrigation and drainage management in a physical setting characterized by massive dike 
polders for flood protection (Fontenelle 2001, 11–17).  In contrast, irrigation and drainage 
based on large polder equipped with large-scale pumping stations as commonly found in 
the Red River Delta did not exist in the Mekong Delta in those days, which was appraised 
technologically ineffective by engineers sent from the North.  What functioned in the 
northern delta could not be bad for the southern delta, they reasoned.  Consequently, as 
mentioned earlier, it was in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the Ministry of Water 
initiated an investment program to build a network of electric pumping stations across 
the Mekong Delta based on blueprints transferred from the Red River Delta.  Ultimately, 
however, the pumping station program turned out to be a misguided undertaking and 
failed.  This is captured in an interview with local irrigation cadres from a district in Cần 
56) In 2011, the Mekong Delta had 1,151 pumping stations, while the total number of irrigation and 
drainage pumping stations in the Red River Delta was more than 3,700 (Vo Khac Tri 2012, 78; 
Nguyen Van Diep et al. 2007, 2).
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Thơ, who, in recollecting on the centrally-mandated hydraulic mission, suggest that water 
engineering programs derived from Northern schemes and state engineers more or less 
blindly followed trial and error approaches as colonial engineers57) had earlier done:
In 1979, there were official guidelines [by the central government] for building large-scale pumping 
stations commanding dyke-protected land with the objective to foster agricultural production and 
control flood waters.  The Department of Water invested in the construction and delegated the 
management responsibility to the districts until 1985.  The pumping scheme had the capacity to 
irrigate 2,500 ha and drain 600 ha of agricultural land.  However, the pumping station failed for 
several reasons.  One problem was that the command area was too large for proper management 
and operation.  Related to this, the uneven ground did not allow for even water level management. 
When water was pumped into the scheme, lower areas were inundated, while in upper areas the 
water level remained shallow. (interview, October 27, 2008)
The failure and the subsequent closure of the pumping station in Vĩnh Thạnh (Fig. 4) was 
not an exception, but representative more broadly the failure of centralized water man-
agement approaches that ignored the local conditions, as national hydrocrats admitted 
retrospectively more than 20 years later:
In the beginning [after 1975], the use of hydraulic engineering technologies that were successfully 
applied in the North . . . made evident deficiencies and required further research to develop more 
adequate technical solutions suitable for the southern rivers.  Hence, the 100 medium and large-
scale irrigation pumping stations did not succeed.  The pumping stations turned out to be ineffec-
tive and thus were shut down again. . . . (Nguyễn Ân Niên and Lê Sâm 2006, 32)58)
Apparently, the deltaic environment of the South was alien to Northern state engineers, 
who had problems reading the local conditions.  After 25 years of national division, they 
found themselves for the first time operating in the South—a place they were not famil-
iar with.  In response to the failure, new hydraulic plans for the Delta temporarily relin-
quished the use of large-scale pumping station,59) but increasingly relied on sluices 
instead.
Large-Scale Operations
Over the years of growing hydraulic efforts, water resources planning60) became more 
57) Biggs (2010, 37–38, 84)
58) Translation by the author
59) It was only in 2008 that the government approved a new investment program for pumping station 
development in the Mekong Delta, but this time under different considerations and with a more 
decentralized and adaptive approach, in which responsibility has been delegated to the provincial 
authorities (Prime Minister 2009).
60) Quy hoạch thủy lợi
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systematic under the Ministry of Water.  Based on new knowledge of local hydrological 
cycles, soil quality, and local flood and salinity regimes generated by the ministerial 
research institutes, it was in the late 1970s that the Sub-Institute of Water Resources 
Planning in Hồ Chí Minh City began to outline the hydraulic planning regions for the 
Mekong Delta.  In principle, as shown in Fig. 5, four major planning regions were identi-
fied, namely: the Long Xuyên Quadrangle,61) the Plain of Reeds,62) the area between 
Bassac (Hậu River) and the Trans-Bassac (Tiền River),63) and the Cà Mau Peninsular.64) 
Simultaneously, for more systematic and standardized planning of space, land and water 
resources, each of the four water resources regions was subdivided into smaller water 
resources areas,65) which were then further subdivided into even smaller units called water 
resources zones66) (Vũ Văn Vĩnh 2006, 54).  Based on these units, national-level engineers 
and planners decomposed the southern waterscape into singular fragments in order to 
reconstruct it on the drawing board as a fully human-regulated and manageable landscape. 
The generation of new knowledge on the Delta was facilitated also because the socialist 
party state rapidly expanded its physical presence and control throughout the Delta.  Rigid 
top-down command and bottom-up reporting mechanisms provided the organizational 
infrastructure to systematically conduct surveys and collect all kinds of data required to 
plan large-scale water resources development in the context of centralized state planning. 
As a result, this inevitably induced an administrative rescaling of water management, 
lifting water resources planning from the local to the regional level and even the national 
level, where the spatial control over water flows became increasingly centralized in the 
hands of hydraulic bureaucrats and engineers.
Based on these plans, state-owned engineering and construction companies carried 
out the first large-scale engineering operations using heavy equipment such as dredges, 
sluices, and partly large-scale pumping equipment.  Despite of numerous setbacks as 
described for the pumping-station program, the number of large-scale infrastructure 
projects has steadily increased.  The influx of capital investment gained further momen-
tum after Đổi mới (1986), when government revenues began to recover and increase as 
a result of economic liberalization and international integration.  Renovation policy stim-
ulated growth and convinced the Western donor community to resume its financial assis-
tance to Vietnam after years of absence.  Finally, renovation policy opened up new finan-
61) Tứ Giác Long Xuyên
62) Đồng Tháp Mười
63) Vùng giữa Sông Tiền và Sông Hậu
64) Bán đảo Cà Mau
65) Vùng thủy lợi
66) Khu thủy lợi
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cial resources for large-scale infrastructure development (Ministry of Water 1994, 68–71; 
Biggs et al. 2009, 210).
The initial post-1975 infrastructural interventions were primarily concentrated in 
the Long Xuyên Quadrangle and the Plain of Reeds, where water resources and agricul-
tural development were less intensive during the French rule and, subsequently, during 
the Southern Republic period (1954–75).  The complex natural conditions in this area, a 
combination of acidic sulphate soils and extreme flooding, coupled to some extent with 
saline intrusion, made water resources development a difficult and costly venture.  Chal-
lenging in terms of its particular natural conditions and sparsely populated, yet character-
ized by a strong revolutionary past, the socialist regime identified the potential of this 
region as the new agricultural frontier for land reclamation, resettlement, and rural devel-
opment (Nguyen Van Sanh et al. 1998, 34; Miller 2003, 399).  The absence of major canals 
was regarded as a major obstacle to water conservancy development, particularly in 
places situated far from the big rivers and natural creeks.  Expanding the canal grid for 
improved irrigation, draining floodwaters more effectively, and washing out acidic soils 
were considered the major targets in the development of the Plain of Reeds and other 
flood-prone areas in the upper Delta.  At the same time, sweetening67) programs were 
67) Ngọt hóa
Fig. 5 Water Resources Planning Regions of the Mekong Delta
Source: Amir Hosseinpour (ZEF).
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initiated in downstream coastal areas to improve salinity control and channel freshwater 
into dike-protected areas (SIWRP 2011, 7).
Public labor campaigns and manual digging lost intensity in the late 1980s, and then 
almost vanished in the mid-1990s, as infrastructure development became increasingly 
mechanized in the transition to large-scale engineering projects.  Table 1 provides an 
overview of the large-scale projects financed by the central government that stood out 
most prominently in the first 20 years after reunification.  Most of these projects ran for 
several years and provided a stable income for engineering companies and their staff. 
Centrally-managed companies under the direct subordination of the ministry, such as 
ICCO 40, DRECO II, or the military-owned Company 622, were involved in almost all 
larger hydraulic infrastructure projects implemented across the delta region.  These 
included canal excavation and dredging works in the upper delta, most notably the Hồng 
Ngự Canal Project in the Plain of Reeds (1977–87), which still is considered a milestone 
Table 1 Hydraulic Work Projects in the Mekong Delta from the National Budget (1976–90)
Year Name of Project Location Duration (Years) Objective Constructor
1977 Hồng Ngự Canal Đồng Tháp 10 Water conservancy DRECO II, ICCO 40
1979 Hòa Bình Canal Minh Hải 10 Water conservancy ICCO 40
1982 Vĩnh Tế Canal Kiên Giang 8 Dredging DRECO II
1983 Sa Rài Canal Đồng Tháp 3 Water conservancy DRECO II
1984
Cái Xe Sluice Hậu Giang 2 Water conservancy Hau Giang Hydraulic Construction Company
Cái Oanh Sluice Hậu Giang 2 Water conservancy Hau Giang Hydraulic Construction Company
Tám Phương Scheme Cửu Long 3 Irrigation ICCO 40, DRECO II
1985
Tri Yên Sluice Long An 2 Drainage ICCO 40
Canal KH5 Kiên Giang 5 Water conservancy ICCO 40
1986
Canal No. 28 Long An 4 Water conservancy DRECO II
Cái Bát Canal Long An 3 Water conservancy DRECO II
Gò Công Sluice Tiền Giang 3 Salinity control TICCO
1987
Đa Lộc Sluice Cửu Long 2 Salinity control ICCO 40
Thanh An Pumping 
Station Hậu Giang 1 Irrigation
Hau Giang Hydraulic 
Construction Company
1988
Long Uông Sluice Tiền Giang 2 Salinity control TICCO
Hiệp Hòa Sluice Cửu Long 2 Salinity control ICCO 40
Tân Thành-Lò Gạch 
Canal Đồng Tháp 2 Water conservancy DRECO II
1989 Bắc Phèn Sluice Cửu Long 2 Salinity control ICCO 40
Sources: Table by the author, data from the Ministry of Water (1994, 68–71) and interviews conducted with 
engineering companies in 2009.
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by Vietnam’s national hydrocrats (Cao Đức Phát68) 2006, 15).  The post-reunification 
hydraulic mission in the South did not only spur mechanization but also nurtured a domes-
tic water engineering industry embedded in the command economy, alongside of which 
the corps of state engineers could further expanded its influence (interviews with state 
agencies and engineering companies, 2009; Hậu Giang Newspaper, May 29, 1985).
The question of how to operate and financially maintain a steadily growing array of 
infrastructure became pressing in the late 1980s.  In response, a second wave of water 
control mechanization followed, which centralized the power over water management in 
the hands of state engineers.  Based on the nascent ideas about water pricing and service 
fees arising in tandem with economic liberalization, the first irrigation and drainage man-
agement companies (IDMC)69) were set up by the mid-1980s at the local level.  They 
were assigned to operate and maintain main canals and headworks such as irrigation and 
drainage sluices, as well as larger dikes (Barker et al. 2004, 27).  Established as financially 
self-sufficient public utility providers, the IDMCs were entitled to collect irrigation ser-
vice fees70) from farmers.  The revenue generated from this levy was used to cover the 
overheads of IDMCs (e.g. salaries and equipment), with the rest being reinvested in 
infrastructure maintenance to ensure the performance of hydraulic works (interviews, 
2008/09).  As in the state-owned engineering companies, IDMCs provided employment 
and career opportunities for engineers.  And in general, this second wave of mechaniza-
tion expanded the socialist hydrocracy’s power in terms of the scope of its mandate, and 
through the accumulation of financial resources and personnel.
As a result of the hydraulic mission, agricultural land in the Mekong Delta expanded 
by 20 percent from 1975 to the 1990s, in particular irrigated paddy land (Le Anh Tuan et 
al. 2007, 22).  Nevertheless, as illustrated in Fig. 6, due to the lack of economic incentives 
under state-imposed agrarian collectivization and the failures of central planning rice 
output fell far short of expectations in the beginning (Nguyen Van Sanh et al. 1998, 47). 
From 1976 to 1979, paddy output even declined.  It was only in the mid-1980s, when 
de-collectivization fully re-established household-based production and economic liber-
alization under Đổi mới unleashed market forces, that the water regulation infrastructure 
laid earlier yielded rapidly growing output (Vo Tong Xuan 1995, 188).  Whereas water 
control technology and technical know-how traveled from the North to the South after 
1975, the shift from central planning to a market-based economy originated in the South, 
most notably in the Mekong Delta.  Early attempts at deviating from the planned economy 
68) Incumbent Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development
69) In Vietnam, these companies are called công ty quản lý và khai thác công trình thủy lợi.
70) Thủy lợi phí
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commenced already by the end of the 1970s, famously becoming known as fence- breaking 
(Porter 1993, 118–127).71)  In the context of Đổi mới, the hydraulic paradigm from the 
North combined with economic liberalization in the late 1980s in the South to produce 
an agro-economic upswing in the Mekong Delta.
VIII Recent Developments towards Total Hydro-Management
The actual boom gained pace in the 1990s, when the central government and the inter-
national donor community revisited older plans for Delta-wide water resources develop-
ment aimed at rural development and poverty reduction.  Funded by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, Vietnamese and foreign engi-
neers and planners under the overall coordination of NEDECO,72) a Dutch water engi-
71) This refers to the national food supply crises in the 1970s and the first rice trade experiments in 
the Mekong Delta.  These informal experiments became possible with the backing of prominent 
party cadres, such as Võ Văn Kiệt, the party secretary of Hồ Chí Minh City (1975–88) and later 
Prime Minister of Vietnam (1991–97), as well as provincial leaders from Long An and An Giang 
province (Rama 2008, 9–27).
72) Netherlands Engineering Consultants
Fig. 6 Annual Rice Output in the Mekong Delta (1975–2007)
Source: Figure by the author, data from the General Statistic Office of Vietnam (GSO).
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neering consultancy group, developed the NEDECO Mekong Delta Master Plan in 1993. 
As summarized in Table 2, by proposing large-scale, multi-purpose water control 
schemes, including flood management measures, salinity control, irrigation, and drainage 
functions, the Master Plan heralded a new era of hydraulic engineering and water control 
in the Mekong Delta.  Based on results of more than 50 different scientific consultancy 
reports, this particular plan is considered the first multi-purpose and multi-sector plan-
ning document for the delta, though the focus clearly remained on water and agriculture 
(Waibel et al. 2012, 169).  Subsequently, huge investment was channeled into large-scale 
water control and irrigation scheme development from the mid-1990s to promote agrar-
ian modernization, rural development, and poverty reduction.
There is little doubt that these technically complex interventions have indeed 
boosted growth, modernized agriculture, and improved livelihoods in the Mekong Delta, 
but they have also spawned unintended side-effects for nature and society.  As it has 
occurred so often as part of large-scale interventions into nature, the recent expansion 
of water control barriers and other regulatory infrastructure significantly changed the 
natural water regime.  As a result, water quality depreciation within closed and fully 
flood-protected irrigation and drainage schemes increased, biodiversity and aquatic 
resources diminished, flood waters shifted to formerly flood-free areas, river bank erosion 
intensified, and canal silting accelerated, just to mention some of the impacts (Le Thi 
Viet Hoa et al., 2007; 2008; Hashimoto 2001).  Even so, water resources management 
continues to adhere to utilitarian notions inherent in thủy lợi, which is entrenched in rigid 
top-down and centralized management regimes.  Critical (local) voices pointing to the 
social and environmental impacts resulting from large-scale engineering projects imple-
mented by the central government and often based on inappropriate technologies and 
Table 2 Large-Scale Water Control Systems Developed in the Mekong Delta from 1995 to 2010
Name of Water Control Scheme Location Service Area (ha)
Quản Lộ-Phụng Hiệp* Bạc Liêu, Sóc Trăng 178,000
Nam Măng Thit* Trà Vinh, Vĩnh Long 225,000
Ô Môn-Xà No* Cần Thơ, Hậu Giang, Kiên Giang 45,000
Tiêp Nhật* Sóc Trăng 53,000
Cần Thơ-Long Mỹ Cần Thơ, Hậu Giang 50,000
Cái Sắn-Thốt Nốt Cần Thơ, Kiên Giang 58,000
Ba Lai Bến Tre 50,000
Bắc Vàm Nao** An Giang 31,000
Ba Rinh-Tà Liêm* Sóc Trăng 30,000
Source: Vo Khac Tri (2012, 76) (modified by the author).
Notes: * World Bank funded water control schemes.
** AusAid (Australian Agency for International Development) funded water control schemes.
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designs have largely fallen on deaf ears.  Seeing themselves being largely excluded from 
decision-making and planning processes of large-scale water control structures, and 
pointing to the failure of national level planners, local officials and experts cynically refer 
to them as Red River Delta design projects.  This view manifests mounting tension 
between central-state hydraulic engineers and local communities, which increasingly 
have contested central state interventions (Benedikter 2014).
Thirty years after reunification and 25 years after the promulgation of Renovation 
(Đổi mới), engineers from North Vietnam still dominate Vietnam’s national hydraulic 
bureaucracy.  They are most powerful because they still enjoy unlimited control over 
central-level state agencies, planning institutes, and the above mentioned engineering 
companies, most of which have been (semi-)privatized in the wake of state-owned enter-
prise reforms.  Their elite networks, which are typically based on cronyism, kinship, and 
patronage—many of which still stem from the Hà Nội Water Resources University—have 
persisted to the present day.  These networks began strategically capturing the hydrau-
lic engineering industry that has become increasingly deregulated in light of Đổi mới over 
the past 20 years (Evers and Benedikter 2009a).  The self-serving interests inherent in 
these resources networks, coupled with a strong adherence to state-planning and notions 
of a developmental state, still prevail as critical factors shaping water resources develop-
ment in the Mekong Delta.  Despite ongoing administrative and fiscal decentralization, 
large-scale water control efforts initiated after 1995, the majority of which involve sig-
nificant amounts of donor money and funds from the state coffers, remain centrally man-
aged by the ministry in Hà Nội, its satellites in Hồ Chí Minh City, and formerly state-
owned engineering companies (Benedikter 2014).
Embedded in these power structures and their underlying vested interests, the 
water resources and infrastructure development initiatives have consistently failed to 
provide space for local communities in the Mekong Delta to participate in spatial planning 
and water management at large scale.  North Vietnamese engineers and their networks 
within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), which replaced the 
former Ministry of Water in 1996 in the light of administration reforms, dominate planning 
procedures.  Off the record, local state agencies in the Delta blame the ministry in Hà 
Nội for neglecting the local conditions and perceptions, while carrying out central-state 
operations from afar (interviews, 2009).  Meanwhile, the role of local state agencies and 
communities is restricted to providing funding for operation and maintenance.  The Water 
Resources Development Project for the Mekong Delta (1999–2009),73) based on the 
NEDECO Master Plan funded by the World Bank and implemented by MARD, exempli-
73) See Table 2: World Bank-funded projects are highlighted by an asterisk.
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fies how the interests of national hydrocrats and their networks dominate and co-opt 
water management approaches, thereby preventing participatory, decentralized, integra-
tive, and polycentric water management reforms from unfolding their effects in real life 
(Benedikter 2014).  Just like in former times, also nowadays in the era of renovation, 
technocratic and centralized birds-eye planning coupled with a trial-and-error orientation 
remain the guiding principles of waterscape engineering as part of the Mekong Delta’s 
path towards total hydro-management.
IX Conclusion
To sum up, this paper illuminated the vital role water control and hydraulic engineers 
have played for the modernization and development of the Mekong Delta subsequent to 
reunification of North and South.  Subduing the Delta’s hydro-ecology and exploiting its 
maximum potential of land and water resources was not only critical in terms of economic 
growth and modernization.  Dominion over the waterscape was also symbolically impor-
tant for the socialist regime to serve political ends such as nation building, state con-
solidation, and bolstering of its political legitimacy in the South.  Environmental and social 
transformation after 1975 was akin to what Scott defines as high-modernism, which man-
ifests in “self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of produc-
tion, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature . . .” (1998, 4).
The state-directed mission of development planned in Hà Nội sought to bring social-
ist modernity to the Southern population, freeing the delta from its backward mode of 
water management and rural production, which would ensure the nation’s food security. 
Authoritarian one-party rule, economic nationalization, and the incapacitation of civil 
society under mono-organizational socialism leveled the social terrain for an exclusively 
state-directed and top-down technocratic hydro-social modernization process.  Spatially 
the socialist hydraulic mission followed the closing off plans conceived by American 
advisers and engineering companies in the 1960s (Käkönen 2008, 206; Miller 2003, 
182–225), while technologically it drew on the water control models that had been imple-
mented in the Red River Delta and other places in the North a decade earlier by the 
socialist state and its hydraulic bureaucracy.
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in general, functioned as development tem-
plate for the South.  In this context, the desire to modernize water utilization and agri-
cultural production in the South, paved the way for a replication of the hydraulic efforts 
made one decades earlier in the North.  The new regime’s diagnosis that knowledge, 
technology, and expertise was lacking in the South opened up opportunities for hydrau-
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lic engineers and planners form the North to dominate water resources planning and 
development in the Southern region.  Water resources development was rescaled as a 
central state mission directed from Hà Nội and implemented in a rigid top-down manner 
through a hierarchical apparatus.  Under Soviet-style central planning and the corre-
sponding political economy, state management and engineering businesses functioned 
as an inseparable unit integrated in the Ministry of Water.  Hydraulic engineers and 
bureaucrats from the North took the place of US-American advisers and engineers.  They 
appeared to be the new designers and implementers of the hydraulic mission and, thus, 
acted as the vehicle along which the hydraulic paradigm traveled from the North to the 
South.  National reunification under Northern guidance in tandem with the hydraulic 
mission provided spatial and institutional space for the socialist hydraulic bureaucracy to 
expand southwards, its power and sphere of influence based on enlarged organizational 
structures, numbers of followers, control over physical space and the flows of water, and 
access to financial resources devoted to capital-intensive structural interventions.  Sub-
sequently, in the wake of gradual mechanization and the growing complexity of water 
control infrastructure, state engineers and hydraulic bureaucrats were able to further 
strengthen their power base in the Mekong Delta.
The specific trajectory shaped by the historical events, from which the hydraulic 
mission evolved after 1975 in the South, has far-reaching implications for present water 
resources management dynamics in the Mekong Delta.  With the hydraulic mission in 
the Mekong Delta receiving its direction from distant Hà Nội, the development of water 
resources and infrastructure again was, and still is, dominated by external ideas rather 
than local notions.  The peculiar power structures that emerged after 1975 in the South 
continue to have an effect on contemporary water management dynamics in the Mekong 
Delta.  What has changed in comparison to the post-unification years, however, is that 
against the background of administrative decentralization and other reforms, central state 
projects more often than in the past are subject to contestation arising from the local 
community’s discontent regarding the social and ecological costs of such projects, but so 
far only with moderate success.  The strategic coalition of water bureaucracy and hydrau-
lic business, in which North Vietnamese engineers are most powerful, remains the 
dominant discourse elite, pushing forward its own agenda and interests.
In essence, as indicative in recent large-scale hydraulic landscaping projects, more 
than 30 years after national reunification, and 20 years after the promulgation of Renova-
tion Policy (Đổi mới), a high-modernist worldview prevails.  This comes along with three 
major issues: the problems for hydrocrats in Hà Nội to read the local conditions; second, 
the defectiveness of centralized water resources planning because of its inflexibly to 
adjust policies and technologies to the peculiar local conditions; and third, that policy 
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formulation in hydraulic management and infrastructure development has often been 
derived from the North’s hydro-ecological and infrastructural conditions, whereas the 
local conditions in the Mekong Delta have been largely ignored.  As the national corps 
of engineers remains overly powerful and local stakeholder involvement is insufficiently 
considered in decision and planning procedures, trial and error prevails as the principle 
modus operandi along which Vietnam’s hydrocracy is developing water resources in the 
Mekong Delta in a technocratic manner.
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